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1. McCallion’s proposed diagnosis and treatment of undergraduate attrition in philosophy
The primary aim of McCallion’s paper is twofold: 1) To outline two concepts that may help
explain the high rates of undergraduate attrition by women (and other “marginalized groups”)
from philosophy, and 2) To offer suggestions for lowering rates of attrition. McCallion’s
proposal is insightful and her suggestions are worthy of further exploration. While I agree with
much of what McCallion has to say, I suspect that at least some of the problems that she
highlights may not be peculiar to philosophy as such. While I won’t have much to say about that,
I do have some concerns with McCallion’s account, and will suggest that at least some of the
issues that she highlights may also be bound up with problems and presuppositions that exist at a
broader socio-political level that may not be covered by her proposed diagnosis and treatment.
If I understand McCallion’s argument correctly, then her central claim seems to be that
the high rates of “women’s attrition from the discipline of philosophy” may be a function of two
core problems that, when combined with situations of “stereotype threat”, results in students
becoming ‘alienated’ from philosophy. The core problems in question are what McCallion calls:
1) Disassociated disagreement, and 2) Extracted speech. In the first case a student is presented
with some philosophical claim, position, question, etc. with which she disagrees (intuitively—
we’ll come back to this later). Unfortunately, the student in question lacks the appropriate
‘means’ or ‘resources’ to properly articulate this disagreement. Because she is a member of a
marginalized group that is subject to stereotype threat, the student then misidentifies this
‘absence of means’ by reinterpreting it through the lens of the now internalized stereotype of
‘women.’ This misinterpretation of her experience leads her to conclude that, as a woman, the
issue at hand (and hence ‘philosophy’ as such) is beyond her ability to understand. The student
ends up mistakenly concluding that philosophy is ‘not for her’ and so switches to another major
(to put it crudely).
The second problem is related to the first, but with an added twist. Here the student is
already in a state of disassociated disagreement, but now her efforts to do philosophy are
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thwarted even further by pressures of various sorts that encourage her to ‘game’ the system, if
you will, by writing philosophical papers and addressing philosophical questions in a manner
that will satisfy the expectations of the authorities involved (e.g. the tutor or Professor). This is
accomplished simply by following some well-worn formula or ‘recipe’, e.g. the typical
‘research-paper’ model which places a strong emphasis on the inclusion of multiple citations
from multiple sources (primary and secondary), and where the questions or issues posed are
addressed following a well-established argumentative structure. Rather than engaging with the
material in a thoughtful, reflective, philosophical manner, the student ends up following the
‘paper-writing formula’ that is typical for that kind of philosophy course (or that kind of
philosophy Professor), ‘plugging’ key terms or phrases into the formula here and there, terms or
phrases which the student does not actually understand but which she is skillful enough (as a
language user) to string together in a grammatically correct manner. The result is a paper which
the student herself doesn’t understand, but which nevertheless gives the appearance of
understanding because it follows the accepted essay-writing formula or recipe in question.
McCallion calls this kind of product extracted speech, claiming that it takes place more often
when students from marginalized groups take courses where the material being covered and the
methods being employed are not diverse and flexible enough to ‘resonate’ or ‘connect’ with such
students.
McCallion’s proposals for helping to alleviate these potential problems operate at two
levels: 1) The departmental level, and 2) The individual level. At the departmental level she
suggests making efforts to diversify the content covered in specific courses so that they include a
wide range of “approaches, methods and traditions” as well as “outlooks” that are taught in a fair
and even manner throughout the course (e.g. instead of being ‘tagged on’ at the end). Identifying
such diversity of content in course syllabi, claims McCallion, may help students to more readily
identify philosophy as something that speaks to their interests, backgrounds, points of view, and
so on. In addition to this, McCallion also suggests that the evaluative component of courses be
broadened beyond the “mainstream” model of the ‘well-cited research paper,’ to include
opportunities for students to explore more “innovative” and academically risky approaches to
philosophical questions.
At the individual level, McCallion offers three suggestions: 1) Educate students about the
potential problems posed by disassociated disagreement and extracted speech, 2) Encourage
students to read viewpoints that are critical of the position or claim with which they are
struggling, and 3) Train tutors, teaching assistants, and so on, to encourage creative responses in
students, e.g. by pointing them to readings that are similar in some relevant sense to the position
that they may be struggling to express.
2. Some modest observations and suggestions
I confess that I enjoyed reading McCallion’s paper. I learned a lot and not only found myself
agreeing with many of her points, but also found myself reflecting upon her ideas for some time
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afterwards. Still, there are some aspects of McCallion’s paper that I do confess to finding a little
troubling. I suspect (or at least hope) that McCallion might be able to ease most if not all of my
concerns if given the chance to further elaborate and detail her account, but I will voice them
here, nonetheless.
The first has to do with her suggestion that course syllabi should include a wider diversity
of approaches, methods, traditions and outlooks than has traditionally been the case. Now I can
see this working well in introductory and intermediary level courses, where the aim is to
introduce students to philosophy, or to same selected range of topics in philosophy, etc. But in
upper level or senior level undergraduate courses (which are often, but not always, much
narrower in scope), including a wide array of approaches, methods, traditions and outlooks in the
syllabi may actually defeat the purpose of such courses (at least in some cases). This is
particularly the case in more ‘advanced’ upper level courses where the primary aim may be to
examine the work of some particular philosopher or ‘school’ of thought in greater depth (e.g.
with an exclusive focus on primary texts). In teaching such courses one may, of course, (perhaps
even should) include references to various, perhaps competing interpretations of the work being
studied; but to include such references (which often arise spontaneously in the context of some
particular class or discussion) in the syllabus itself seems a little unrealistic. One might try to
alleviate these kinds of issues by ensuring that there are also other courses at the upper level that
have greater breadth of scope (to balance things out, as it were), but trying to build these kinds of
‘forced constraints’ into a curriculum that also includes respect for academic freedom (on the
part of Professors or Instructors) would be a difficult balancing act.
My second concern has to do with McCallion’s proposal for diversifying the range of
assessments in a course to provide students with the opportunity to better ‘explore’ alternative
philosophical pathways beyond the mainstream ‘well-cited research paper.’ While I agree that it
is absolutely vital that students be encouraged to engage with questions, issues, and so on in a
genuine, philosophical manner (this is, after all, what philosophy students should be learning to
do, and hopefully doing better as they advance through their degree), the pressures to satisfy preestablished expectations and standards extends not only to students, but to the professors and
instructors of those courses as well. Departments, for example, often have to satisfy the
expectations and standards set by broader governing bodies. These governing bodies in turn
often have to satisfy the expectations and standards set by governments, industry, or some other
external ‘authority’ that might be funding such programs. The pressures to ‘perform’ (which in
many societies often means having one’s work measured against some market-based metric) are
often so extensive and ubiquitous that it is difficult to say where they begin and where they end.
Thus, the pressures to follow mainstream models of assessment may themselves be difficult to
counter in an effective way, especially in large classes where the range of viable evaluation
methods may be limited.
Further, the pressures that students face to ‘game’ the system is, to a large extent, created
and sustained by the system itself, viewed in a very broad sense. While course syllabi that only
include the ‘well-cited research paper’ as their main assessment tool may invite or encourage this
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kind of activity, one must also keep in mind that the pressures to game the system come from a
multitude of sources, e.g. the ways in which we distribute students awards, the ways in which we
measure and evaluate teaching (which may encourage the instructor to choose assessments that
will better guarantee good teaching scores) and, more broadly, the ways in which student
attitudes, attention, judgment and general ‘ways-of-seeing’ are shaped by the broader social,
political, educational and other forces that characterize our general manner of being-in-theworld. What I’m suggesting here, I suppose, is that when philosophy students ‘game’ a course by
writing ‘the well-cited research paper’ in a manner meant to assuage the evaluator’s
expectations, this need not be evidence of disassociated disagreement in the students in question.
Many cases of this kind of extracted speech may actually be the result of pressures and forces
that are different from disassociated disagreement, and while we should definitely keep an eye
out for evidence of the latter (and try to counter it as best we can whenever we suspect it), we
should also keep in mind that the rote, formulaic strategies students employ may have little to do
with the particular approaches, methods, traditions, and outlooks that are being covered in a
course. Identifying cases where extracted forms of speech are a function of disassociated
disagreement might also be difficult, especially in large classes where the opportunities for
individual interaction with students may be limited. I suspect that McCallion would likely agree
with these points but thought it worth making them more explicit than might otherwise be
possible in a concise paper of this sort.
My third concern is with McCallion’s account of what she calls extracted speech. First,
what she identifies as extracted speech does not appear to be different in kind from the general
sort of ‘formulaic,’ ‘rote’ format that many students follow in the writing of an essay or the
answering of a question on a test. I have seen many examples of this kind of formulaic paper
over the years, and I would suggest that this kind of rote, extracted speech is a familiar feature of
academic life in general that is not unique to philosophy as such. It is a strategy that students
learn to develop and master (and in some cases are even taught to employ) throughout the
general course of their educational development. Hence this kind of strategy is something that
most if not all students are always already familiar with well before they take any course in
philosophy. It is something that I would suggest most students do most of the time, almost by
default—and this is the important point here. In my own experience, at least, this kind of default
way of seeing, thinking, writing, and so on, is so prevalent that one has to continuously warn
students against it when trying to get them to think philosophically. In many cases, this kind of
automatic, rote way of responding to a question or issue is so deeply entrenched that students
don’t know what it means to ‘think’ in a genuine philosophical sense (I will say a little more
about this below). Given this, I’m not sure it’s so easy to tell when a student is writing as they
are because they are experiencing disassociated disagreement, and when they are simply falling
back on old habits and ways-of-doing, as it were.
My fourth point has to do with McCallion’s account of disassociated disagreement. She
seems to suggest that disassociated disagreement only arises in marginalized groups. Now I don’t
know if I count as a member of a marginalized group (I’m a white male from a mixed
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Irish/English background who was raised in what we might broadly classify as a ‘poor’
household), but I recall having many experiences of the sort she describes, both as a student and
as a professional academic. Even now there are some topics, subject matters, problems,
philosophers, etc. that leave me silent, haunted by feelings of inadequacy or incompetence of the
sort she describes (and which in many cases I was later able to articulate as a disagreement that I
had with the position in question, but one that I only learned to articulate over time). This raises
two questions for me about McCallion’s account. The first has to do with the sense of
‘marginalization’ that is being outlined here. There are, I would suggest, lots of ways in which
one can be ‘marginalized.’ When McCallion uses that term, I suspect that she is using it in
something like a political, social, or economic sense, as a matter of marginalized political
‘power’ for example. In at least some of the cases of disassociated disagreement that I’ve
experienced, however, I don’t think the marginalization in question was of a political or social
kind (at least not in the ordinary sense of those terms, e.g. as a kind of ‘power’ dynamic). It was
more like a sense of marginalization that comes with ‘not being in the know,’ that is, of not being
familiar with a certain set of background conditions, assumptions, presuppositions, etc.,
background conditions that the author or people involved (e.g. at a conference) are so familiar
with that they could simply ‘take them for granted,’ as it were, e.g. as elements which enabled a
higher level of discussion that I was simply unable to follow (I sometimes get this feeling in
argumentation conferences, for example, or when reading certain scholastic writers). I suggest
that in at least some cases the marginalization that gives rise to the experience of disassociated
disagreement that McCallion is highlighting is not political, social, or economic in the normal
sense of that term, but is of a more conceptual or ‘linguistic’ character (for lack of a better term).
To frame it in Wittgenstein’s terms, such marginalization may result from being exposed to a
specialized ‘language game’ that we have not yet learned how to adequately play. Or as Latour
might put it, it is a mode of being to which we have not become properly attuned, making our
thinking ‘out of key’ with the philosopher that one is studying, or the topic being discussed.
This brings me to my second point, namely, that in some cases the resources needed to
properly orient oneself in such cases may require more than simply exposure to some alternative
approach, method, tradition, and so on as McCallion suggests. In some cases, reorientation may
be something that can only be accomplished through the accumulation of a sufficient amount of
experience over a broad range of time. In such cases there may not be any shortcuts (e.g. read
this, and then you’ll ‘get it’), but only the need to keep working through it until enough
experience has been accumulated to bring the issue in question into the right kind of focus or
light, as it were. Plato hinted at this. So too did Kant when he suggested that certain kinds of
questions could only truly be addressed after one reached a certain age. This is not an idea that I
can fully develop here, but merely something that I am ‘throwing out there’ for further
consideration.
My final concern is with McCallion’s appeal to what she calls a student’s “organic
intuitions.” While I think I understand what she is pointing to here, she never really explains
what she means by this (and similar phrases), and this lack of clarity may lead some to
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misinterpret this language. What McCallion means by this, I take it, is that when a student is
experiencing disassociated disagreement, she lacks the proper resources to adequately articulate
her disagreement with the philosophical ideas, claims, position, and so on in question. The
“ineffability of their confusion” (a truly lovely phrase) results not only in the student feeling
“lost,” but she is also silenced in a way that leaves her unable to call for help. It is when in this
state that a student’s “organic intuitions” have a vital role to play, for they provide her with some
means of anchoring her experience and reorienting herself again so as to begin the difficult task
of learning how to articulate the grounds of her ‘felt’ disagreement. If this is what McCallion
means (or something like this) then it is an important aspect of her account. The problem is that
such language as: “develop their organic intuitions,” “write the philosophy we wanted to read,”
“a way of doing philosophy that they can identify with,” and other analogous expressions, can be
interpreted in a negative manner that simply reinforces a student’s present ideas, concepts,
beliefs, ways-of-seeing, and so on. It’s not that I think McCallum’s account is mistaken or
wrong, it’s just that she doesn’t emphasize enough, I would suggest, the vital role that critique,
and especially self-critique plays in philosophical thought (or at least in philosophical reflection
as I understand it). While all philosophical reflection must begin wherever we happen to find
ourselves, with whatever ideas, beliefs, ways-of-seeing, and so on, we happen to be working
from (which I take to be a central element of Pragmatism), such reflection should not simply take
that starting point as true in any absolute sense, e.g. as something to be settled within and
reinforced. It seems to me that genuine philosophical reflection should also include a critical
moment that involves the questioning and self-critique of our present ‘intuitions’ as well,
whatever they happen to be. It may turn out that, after such critical reflection, we end up
accepting our original intuitions; but anchoring ourselves in our intuitions in any strong sense
should only come after a period of rigorous and honest critical reflection has already been
undertaken. While I suspect that McCallion might agree with this (as the account of her
‘mathematical’ friend’s development suggests), I think the kind of genuine philosophical
engagement that she is trying to promote here might benefit by placing more emphasis on the
critical aspect of philosophical thought (including the important task of self-critique).
I will end with a few modest suggestions. Philosophy Departments come in a variety of
sizes and ‘schools.’ Not only this, but undergraduate courses in those departments also vary quite
a lot, depending especially on the kind and level (or year) of the course in question. McCallion
might benefit from tailoring at least some of her proposals so that they better account some of
these differences. For example, diversity of content in a syllabus may be more important at lower
level courses than in upper level ones. It might also be more important in ‘topics-oriented’
courses rather than courses of a highly specialized or focused character. The need to include a
more diverse range of content in course syllabi may be greater in smaller Departments than in
larger ones, for larger Departments would likely include a broad range of Professors who,
between them, actually ‘do philosophy’ in very diverse ways. Students in larger Departments
would likely have a greater chance of being exposed to different approaches, methods, traditions
and so on, simply by taking courses with a variety of different professors (until they find one
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who has “a way of doing philosophy that they can identify with”). In smaller Departments,
however, or in Departments whose members generally follow more homogeneous approaches,
methods, etc., then it may be more important to incorporate greater diversity into the syllabi of
those courses in the way that McCallion suggests. There are likely a host of other contextual
considerations that might be relevant here, but these are the ones that come to my mind for the
time being.
As I said at the beginning, I enjoyed reading McCallion’s paper and learned a great deal
from it. I think her proposed diagnosis of disassociated disagreement and extracted speech, as
important contributing factors in the high levels of attrition by women (and other marginalized
groups) from philosophy, is not only plausible, but worthy of further consideration, exploration
and testing. I encourage her to continue developing her project, refining and revising it as needed
(as happens with any good hypothesis).
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